Document-borne AI worms can self-propagate through Copilot for Word

一句话概要

I would like to thank Microsoft product teams and Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) for collaborating with me on this technical analysis and mitigation of the disclosed vulnerabilities.

原文开头节选

The findings described in this post are part of a coordinated disclosure with MSRC and Microsoft product teams. Microsoft was provided with reproduction steps, videos, environmental assumptions, and the exact proof-of-concept (PoC) prompts used during testing. They were also informed of a 90-day coordination period before disclosure. This was extended two times, resulting a 144-day coordination period.

In parts 1 and 2 in this series, I have shown how external inputs could influence Copilot responses and, in some cases, potentially lead to confidentiality impacts through Cross-Domain Prompt Injection Attacks (XPIAs) . This report builds on those findings and extends the XPIA analysis from single-interaction compromise to propagation across trusted document workflows. It shows that attacker-controlled instructions in one document can be copied into Copilot-generated or Copilot-edited Word documents, causing those downstream documents to become new carriers of the same attack.

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